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-lfltis -papet--surveys--the -dcvelo·plrtt'nt- of ···human--rights- in· 
· the United States during the past two decades. Even brief 
comment on all matters which might be considered human 
rights would require a book. This more modest undertaking 
discussl's only those ;:ights arising out of the creation of & 
democratic system of government, .the protection of individual 
rights in a system of . criminal justiee. and the protection of 
minority groups against discrimination. 
'l'he focus of this discussion i<J on the deci<Jions of the 
courts. The legi<Jlature and the executive establish some prin-
ciples of lmn!f!n rig-lib; (1) and they provirle procedures to effec-
tuate prindples derived from other sources (2). But our 
most -basic human rights arc guarantees in the Constitution, 
and it is the function of the Supreme Court to interprei those 
guarantees in the specific cases .before it.. Since tl1e govern-
ment has e.nforcecl the Court's decisions with respect to the 
pa rti0S before the Com1, those decisions mark a point at whlch 
rights will be vindicated. 
Victory in a law suit does not mean that no one will ever 
deprive at;other of that particular right again. 1\Ien and 
(!) f. g. c The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and res-
ponsibility of the federal Government to use all practicable m&anS consistent 
with its needs and obljgations and pther essential ce>nsiderations of national 
policy ... to coordinate and utdi::e all its plans, functions and resources for· the 
purpose of creating and maintaining... conditions under which there w1ll be 
aflorded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment. for those 
crble, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, pro-
duction and purchasing power." 15 U.S.C. 1021 {19~6). Also Congress has 
provided minimum wage and hour lcnvs {Fair Labor Standards. Act 29 U.S.C .. 
§ 2Dl-19) and granted workers the .right to organize unions free of employer 
interlerence (National Labor ·Relations Act 29 U.S.C., § 151-68). 
(2) E.g. Laws requiring the presentation of opposing viewpoints In the radio 
and television industry. 45 U.S.C.. § 315 (a) {1964) ; 37 C.F.R. 13.123, 13.300, 
73.595 and 73.679. See also tire l<>gislcrtion discussed in the text affecting voting 
rights, public accommodations and employment. 
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governments will always do what the laws and the courts 
declare is "-Tong. The victims of such acts may not be able 
to get damages or a court order to remedy such >rrongs. They 
may not have the sophistication or financial resources neces-
sary to commence litigation. They may fear that social pres-
sures against them for having bron~ht suit wouid be more 
harmful than any benefit derived by such suit. Finally, 
they may be defeated in their suit_ by procedural obstacles 
before they can get a decision on the merits. However, jt . 
·remains true that the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court interpreting the Constitution provide the basic yard, 
stick by which to measure the progress of human rights in the 
-·united Si<'ltes· overi:he past twenty-years:·- - -------
, I. - Democratic government 
Electoral procedures have become far more democratic -
in the past ten years as a result of several major changes. A 
Constitutional amendment, new statutes and judicial decisions 
have made it easier for the poor man and black man to vote 
and have made each person's Yote of equal effect. Progress 
has been less dramatic in other areas which are preconditions 
for a democratic society, but speech and travel have fewer 
restrictions as a result o:f judicial deeisions over the past 
twenty years. The separation between church and state has 
been increasingly defined and an uneasy compromise between 
religious toleration and religious need maintained . 
. A. - THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
Questions of civil rights and civil liberties generally arise 
in the context o:f the relationship between the indindual and 
his government. Thus the basic civil right is free and equal 
suffrage. Unkss the government is responsive to the people 
and each individual has an equal participation in the creation 
of the ~overnmcnt, the vap between the citizen and te govern-
ment will widen to the detriment of both civil rights and the 
citizen's r~pect for the law. 
In 1964, a constitutional amendment was adopted. 
Tke right of citizens of the U11ited States to vote in any 
primar1J or other election for President or Vice President, 
for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator 
r'r Rr[>NSOifrrth•es in Cnngress, shall not be denied or 
nbridgr:d by the United States or any State by rcnson of 
t~n7ure tr~ ]J(l!J any 1Joll tax or other tax (3). 
Cntilll%li. however, the rights to vote for ·state office was 
still tC>:Hliti,;!1rd in some statPs upon the payment of a poll 
tax: ot up t0 8 ~. Then the Supreme Court declared such a 
tax un•:o!lstiturionnl as a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
mend of tl:e Constitution which prohibits a ;;;tate from Q(·aying 
an~· pen;on "'equal protection of the laws". The Court stated : 
''\"\-e:1lth or fee pa:'·ing hns, in our view, no relation to voting· 
1p.wlitication~ ; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental 
- t<:r lJe so -brrrdeue·ct or cotiditioiii.;d -(4r"- -T:ne CoilrCalso im-=-a.:-· 
Iidated on the basis of the ""equal protection"clause, a pro·<:i;;;ion 
of a state constitution which prevented members of th€ arm€d 
services who moved to that state from ;:requiring a votin(!: resi-
dence ther€. "There 1~ no indication in the Constitution that ... 
occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing bet-
ween qualified voters within the State (5)." Even elections 
for a limitefl purpose, and not for general representation in 
the goTernment. nnist indude all qualified voters having the-
requisite of residencce and age u....'iless "the exclusions are neces-
sar: to promote a compelling state interest (6)." Under tllis 
stan.1ard , the Court invalidate-d a pro-.;-ision for school"board 
elections whiel1 required voters either to own taxaule real pro-
perty within the school district or be parents of children 
enrolled in. the local public schools (7). 
The most difficult voting problem in the United States 
has been to implemei1t the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee 
that "'the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any 
State on account of race, color or previous condition of ser-
vitude (S).'' The Comt invalidated the exclusion of negroes 
by a political part;;- in its primary election where that political 
party dominated elections in a county (9). It held that a 
citY conld not redefine its borders in order to exclude th!} 
ar~as where negro voters lived (10). In another case, the 
(3) U.S. Cor.st. amend. XXIV. 
l~J Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electio1l3, :JS3 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
{5) Carrington v. Rr:mp, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). 
{6) Kramer v. Union Free School District, :o• 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
(7) ld. 
(8) U.S. Canst. amend. XV. 
(9) Terry v. Adam~. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Nominees o! the associcrtlo,; "\ln!te· 
always no:nincated as the candidates of the Democratic party which alway• , 
won the elections in that county. 
00) GonuWon v. Ligbttoot, 354 U;S. 339 (1960). 
REVUE INTERN..:\TlONALE DE DROIT PfNAL 
Court found that a state· requirement that voters "'inter·pret'' 
.a cause of the state or federal Constitution selected hv the 
voting registrar ,,·as part of a plan to dt'pri•e negl'oes of their 
right to vote, and it affirmed an injtmction to stope the use 
-of such a test (11). Even where the literacy test was fair on 
its face and fairly administered, the Court struck it (lo'm 
where its ·effect, hecatisc of a prior disability in education, 
·was to Or>IWive largP numh<>J-s of n<>groes of the franchise {12). 
Further, staks eanuot !l<'siguate tlw race of c~mdidatcs on· 
the ballot (13). 
But judif,ial action faced formitlahle obstacles~ Case by 
. ease adjudieation is a slow piecemeal process. Negroes were 
afr.aid to bring suit for fear of the community reaction against 
:them __ Hven_a:f:ter iha.. Giv_iLRights Act of 1957 gave the 
Attorney General a powt•r to bring -~uit -agaimt- -a --state. a ncr 
its offi.eials to protect the voting rights {)f negroes (14), pro-
gress was slow. To remedy this -deficiency, Congress passed 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (15). The Act covers af1y 
-state or sub:division .of a state which maintained .a "test or 
-device~ ~ Df Noven1her L 1%4 and '\'here the DirPctor of Cen-
sus detcrmint>d that 1<'ss than 50 <;o of its voting-age residents 
wer~ registered to vote on No>einber 1, 1964, or voted in ·the 
presidential election of tl1at yrar. It provided that no person 
could lJe denied the right to vDte because of this .failure to 
· ~omply ,dth such test or device or any subsequent test or 
. deVice to \vhich the Attorney Gt'n<'rnl of the l)nited States 
ltas objected. In addition, the feticral civil scrvite commission 
\VaS reqtiired to ap-point Toting e.'::aminers whenever the Attor-
ney. General certified. <'it1H'r that he had reeeiv~d meritorious 
complaints from at least twenty residents that they have 
1,een disenfranchio:;cd under color of law berausc of their rat<', 
or that t]fe avpointment of examiners was otherwise nece_ssary 
to effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment (16) . 
. (11) Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 1;15 (1965). 
{12) Guston County, North Carolina v. United Stoles, 39S U.S. 28S (1959). 
(13) Ander.son v. M~, :rJS U.S. 399 (1964). 
(14) 42 u:s.C: sec. 1971 {c). See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 
(1965). 
(15) 42. U.S,C. sec. 1973 et seq. 
(16) These provisiOns were upheld as a proper exercise of congressional 
power under fu.e Fil.teer}th J\mendment in State of South ·Carolina v. Katzenbacb, 
383 U.S. 301 (1956). the Voting Rights Act also stated thcrt no person wl::o 
colnpleted the · sjxlh grade in a public school .or in a private school accedited 
-:by, 1he Commonwealth of ,Puerto Rico. in which the language of bstruction was 
oilier· than .English could be denied the franchise because of his inability to 
read or write English. This was upheld as constitutional in Katzenbac:h v. }.for-
gan, 384 U.S. 641 (1956).. The Voting Rights Act of 1970, 84 Stat. a1..o1 extended 
-the right to vote to !8 year olds. In most , states the age limit was 21 years. 
"The validity of the Act ia ·being challenged. W. the Supreme Court. 
The value and the purpose of the right to vote is dimi-
nished unless every person's vote is given equal weight. In 
almost every state, each person's vote was counted equally-
in choosing the. reprrsentative from his area (17). Ho"\\·cver, 
in many states the number of persons represented by· each 
lcgi.<:;l:ttor varied ·w-ide1y. Thus, the vote of a legi<>lator repre-
senting 10,000 would be equal to the vote of a legislator 
r~prP.scnting 90,000. Prior to 19D2 tho Court refused to deeidc 
the constitutionality of dispropm·tionate· districts on the 
grounds that the issue \Yas politicai and 110t judicial in 
nature {18). In 1962 the court hPld that the issue should be 
~eeided {19). In subsequent -decisions it held that congres-
-sional· ·di.stricts- -for rqm:srntatiorr -in --tire -fcdera1- House--or--
Representatin's must ht'. equal in population CWI, that the 
scats in hoth houses of a bj-cameral state legislature must 
be app9rtioncd on a population basis -(21) -even if the majority 
of the state's voters .. aiJprow a different basis (22), and that 
offices in the local eount;.- w-ithin a state must be voted for 
on a population hasis (23). 
Legislators represent ·people, not trees or aaes... Wd-
gh·ing the '!Jotes of citizens differently, by any method or 
me(mS, 1ne·rcly becnnse of where they happen to reside, 
lllmlly seems justijiablt.... Since legislatures are respon-
sible for owctinu lag·s by u·hich all citizens m·c to be 
governed, they shnnld be bod1:es 1r.:h1'ch are collecti·z:cly 
responsible to the popular ":will. And tlw umccpt of equal 
protection has bern fraditionallJJ t:ieu·Fd as requiri11g the 
uniform treatment of perso-n sta·nd-i·ng in the S(l.mc re-
laNon to the gol'crn mental action q-ne.stioned or chal-
lenged. With respect to the allocation of legislative rezn·c-
se?dation, all •t~ofcrs, ns citizens of a State, stand in the 
sa·me relation regnrdless of where they li'L;e. .,by S1tg-
gestcd criteria for the di.(fr:·rentiat·ion of citizeus are insuf-
ficient to jw:tify any tli.~criminrzfinn. ns to fJH< 1eeight nf 
tJwir t'otes, unless relcrrznt to the permissible purposes of 
lc!}islati1.Je apport·iomncnt. Since the achie·vi11g of fair and 
(17) But see Gray v. Sanders, :rlZ U.S. 36ll {1963) -which lnvalid:rted Georgia's 
county unit system under which st:rtewide representatives -were chosen in a 
way which favored rural voters over urban voters. 
{18) Colegrove v. Green, 3Z8 U.S. 495 {1946). 
(19) Bal::er v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
(20) Wesberry v. s:roders, 376 U.S. 1 {1964). 
(21) Reynolds v. Sims, :m U.S. 533 (1964). 
(22) Lucas v. forty-/ourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 0964} 
atating « A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be infringed simply because 
G majority of the people choose to do so.» Jd. at 736-Sl. 
(23) Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
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effective representation for all citizem is concededly the 
basic aim of leuislrrti·ve apportionment, 1ce concl1lde that 
the Equal Protection Clnuse guarantees the oppl)rtunity 
for equal partic·ipation by an .voters in the election of 
slate legislators (24) 
:r:ven if the local, state "or national .office c~uld properly 
be an appointive one, "once a state has decided to use the pro-
cess of popular election and 'once·the class of voters is chosen 
and their qualifications classified, we (The Court) see no cons-
titutional way by which equality of voting power may be 
evaded.' " (25). 
The right to vote would lose its value if the electeed official 
. ___ could not .ser.ve ... -In 1%G-, -the House of Representati>~-s-voted- -
to exclude Congressman Adam Clayton Pow·ell Jr., on the basis 
of his behavior d1.u·ing the preceeding session of Congress. In 
1969, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its 
· powers and -~ould not exclude any individual elected by the 
voters unless such individual ·was ineligible for office by vir-
tue of qualifications sta'ted in the Constitution (26). 
B. - RIGHTS OF FREE SPEECH, ASSEMBLY 
Al."\TD ASSOCIATION 
The intelligent exercise of the right to vote is dependent 
on freedom of speecl1 and press so that all sides of· every issue 
may }Je examined. · 
The Constitution _provides "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. (27)., Yet 
some :restriction on speech has al·ways been recognized. ·"The 
most stringent protection. of free speech would not protect a 
man in faJscly shouting fire in theatre, and causing a pa-
nic." (28). The test traditionally used for determining whether 
(24) Reynolds v. Sims, supra note 21 at 562. 563, 565. The composition of 
the federal Senate was not called into question or relevant to the decision since 
the system of two senators to e01ch state was adopted as a result of a compro-
mise agreement among sovereign states whereas the districts within a alate 
ate creations of the state. 
· {25) Hadley v. Jrmior College District, 397 U.S. W {1970) requiring equality 
Jn voting for trustees of a .Junior college. 
(26) Powell v. McCormark,. 395 U.S. 496 {1969). Congressman .Powell was 
•eated ln the following Congress •vlt.'Jout incident, but issues involving his hade 
pay· during the period of his exclusion are still being litigated. 
(27) U.S. Cons!. amend. I. 
(28) Schenk v. United State~, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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speech of a political nature may be restricted hn.s been "whether 
the words used arc used in such eircnmstances and are of such 
·a -nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring ahout the snhstantive evils that Congress has a right 
to prevent." (2D). This test has been restated recently as 
follo1vs : '"The constitutional guarantees of free speech and 
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advo-
cacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action." (30). 
--·For exfl:mple;--the .Cou-rt reversed ·the eom>k-tions-of· anti-war 
protesters where tl1e trial judge stated they could be convicted 
for doing or sayin!_i '"that which offends, disturbs, incites, or 
tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area." 
The Court held that conviction on such a ground ·:was an abrid-
gement of freedom of speech (31). · ·· 
The dominant trend of court decisions in tlie past two 
decades has been require any restriction on free speech to be 
drawn in the narrowest pos.~ible terms. In 1941 Congress 
passed the Smith Act (32) which made it a criminal offense 
to advocate, abet; advise or teach "the duty. necessity, desira 
bility, or propri·.::ty of overthrowing or destroying the govern-
me_nt of the United States ... by force or violence ... ; ... or ... to 
organize any society, group or assembly of persons who teach, 
advocate or cneoura~e the o>erthrow or destruction of any 
such government by force or violence ; or becomes or is a 
member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group or 
assembly of persons, lmowing the purposes thereof." (33). 
The Supre:rre Court held that the term "organize" referred 
only to the creation of a new organization and not to acts 
thereafter performed in carrying out its activities (34). Fur-
ther, the Court held that the Smith Act does not prohibit 
~advocncy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract 
principle, di;-nrced from any effort to instigate action to that 
end." (35). 'Y-!th respect to the membership c1ause, the Dourt 
held that the statute does not make criminal any membership 
in an unlawful organization with knowledge of its unlawful 
(29) Id. 
(30) Brondebourg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1909). 
(31) Bacheiiar v. Maryland, 3'i!l U.S. S64 .(1970). 
C32) 18 U .s.c;. aec. 2385. 
(33) Upheld as constitutional in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. -494 (1951). 
The Smith Act superseded all alate legislation proscribinq '!edition agcdnst tbe 
United States. Peruuylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 4W {1956). 
(3-l) Yates ..-. United States, 3S4 U.S. 298 {1957), 
(35) lcl. at 318. 
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purpose unless the individual specifically intends to· accom-
plish that pu11losr. hy resort to violence (36). Suhsequen:t 
decisions have made it dear that this intcrpretationpof the · 
statute was lwsrd on constitutional requircmmts of free speech 
and due process (37.). _ 
The application of overbroad· criminal subversive legis-
lation has been enjoined before any criminnl prosecution was· 
initiated unJcr it and dcSJJitc the ·fact that the law mig-ht 
he limited thmug1l stat<' judicial construction_ ""The chilling 
dfcct upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive 
·from the fact of the prosecution, unaffecter1 by the propects 
of success or faihrrc (38)." 
States may enact laws punishing false or malicious defa-
mation of racinl and religious groups (39), but there can be no 
prosecution for libel on go.-ernment (40). ~'ill individual 
publi1~ figure, cannot recover damages for. a defamatory fal-
sehDod l'clating to his official conduct ~ess he proves that 
the statement was .made \vith 'actual malice'-that is, :with 
knowledge that it was false or v.-ith reckless disregard of whe-
thf'l" it was ftilse or not {U)." 
:Means oiher than civil or criminal penalties haV.e been 
'employed to restriet the expression of ideas antitheticru to the 
go.,ernment. ·Two mPthods aw loyalty oath requirements for 
~mploymmt ancl dismissal :from. or denial of employment on 
the grounds of dis1oyalty. The Court has been quick to 
strik:t- down lo~-alty oaths for public emplo:vment · or state-. 
eonferrcd benefits where they require individuals to prove 
their loyalty (42) or where their ,·agueness might be inter-
preted to cover innocent activity (43) such as membership in 
an m·ganization \vithout sharing the i11egal purpose of the 
organization ·(44). 
(36} Note v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 {1961}. 
(37) See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 37B U.S. 500 (1954) ; Eifbrandt v. 
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) ; Keyi.shian v. Bocrrd ol Regents of the University of 
the .State of New Yorl:, 385 U.S. sag (1957). 
(38) Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). 
(39) Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). This case has been shar-
ply Criticized as an improper inbingement on the right to speak. See EMERsoN, 
Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment; lOS (Vintage Books 1966}. 
{40) Rose.,blcrtt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, SO (1966); New Yorl: Times Co. v. 
Sullivcrn, 376 U.S. 254, 291-92 (1964). 
(d) New York Times, supra note 29 at 279-W. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64 (1964}: Henry v. Collins, 3BO U.S. 356 (1965). 
(42) Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. Sl3 (1958). 
(43) Cram.p v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baggett Y. 
BuUitt, m U.S. 360 (1964}. . 
(44) Eltbrcmdt v. RussaU, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
Recently a statute requiring the discharge of teachers for 
the utterance of "seditious" words was invalidated on the 
grom1ds of Yaguencss. The Court said "'the danger nf that 
chiUing effert upon the exercise of vital First Amendment 
rights must hr gnnnlecl against h:'r sen . .,itive tools '"hich 
clearly infol'm· teachers "·bat is being sanctioned (45)." · The 
Court hrrs held that a state could not ref.uc;e to admit an indi-
vidual to the praetiee of law because hr wtts a 'member Df the 
Commnnist Pur(\" two decades prcvi0li:s1y (46) and thnt a 
st<J.tutc prohibiting persons from sr1·ving Dn the governin~ 
body of a labor organization who are or have been :within the 
last five vea,rs members of the Communist Partv was mva1id 
as a bill ·~fatt~ind~r or "'trial by legislature~"' .(47). 
The Court has hern rcinctant to , act where employees 
are di<>chm·gcd from deft;nse establishments (-18), but reeently 
it required the reiustatement in a shivyard of an employee 
who was a member o! the Connimnist Party. The Court poin-
ted. out that the flaw in the law was that membership would . 
cause dismic;s..1.l even .if the employee was 1maware of the ain1s 
of the .Communi'>t J'arty or disagreed with tl10se aims or was 
a pa..o:sin· mcmuer of the organization or the position from. 
which he \Vas fired wa.'> mot J1articulurly sensitive (although 
withili a "defense :taeilit;V") (±9)'. 
In l!lG6 <l state legislature PXChlLh'd ·a rer!l·esentath·e wllO 
stated .that he was ·Dpposf'd to the war in Viet ~am and who 
· e~ressed his · adnuration for· the courage of those persons 
who burn(>d tbeir clraft {:ards (:50) despite the possible jail 
senten<:cs. The Court hdd that disqualifieution because of 
his statemmts violated 'the legislator·s right of free e~-pres­
sion {51). The Court has even enjoined a high school from 
suspending students 'Who wore h1ack arm bancls to protest the · 
war ilf-Viet X am ,\·here :;uch action did not interfere with 
the activities of the school or intrude on the rights of other 
· stud<'nt<; (Ii2). Final!}-. the f'onrt has required reinstatement 
of a school tcachf'r •rho made remarks critieal of the school 
(45) Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra note Zl at 684. 
(46) S.cbware 'V, Beard of Bar Ex=iners .of New Mexico, 353 U.S: 232 .(1957). 
{47) United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 4'!7 .(l965). 
(48) See Cafeteria and RestcruJU!lt Wod:er.FVnion v. McElroy, 3f)l U.S. 886 
(1961). 
{'49) United States v. Robel,,989 U.S. 258 (1967). 
(50) In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 307 (1968). the Court permitted· 
conviction for burning a draft ,,card despite ,arguments that def!!ndant's rights 
of free speech .were violated. 
(51) Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. ll6 {1956). 
(52) T.tnl-er v. Des !Vfoin~. 393 U.S. S03 (1969). 
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system, even though those rematks were false (53). The 
Court noted that ·such remarks did not in the particular case 
prevent the te~ehcr from continuing his work because they 
were (lirectcd at more remote or indir!'ct supervisors ::rather 
than immediate supcrvisl}ry personnel and that such remarks 
should -be protected because they were not knowmgly or reck-
l<:ssly false statements. 
· Expression which is not directly political in nature may 
also be important to the social fabric of the nation. Control 
over men's thoughts and expressions in any area may have 
significant· stultiiying effects on intellectual exploration and 
personnel freedom, however necessary such restrictions may 
be for Qther _reaso.P..s. S_ta:tes. may .ban .materiaL where _4<.to the--
average person, applying contemporary standards, the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the 
prurient interest" (54) and which .. goes -substantially beyond 
-cm~tomary limits of candor in· description or representation of · 
such matters (55). Nevertheless, "a work cannot be proscribed 
unless it is 'utterly' without social importance (56)." In the 
application ol these standards "in close cases, e:vidence of 
pandering fin the .ad•-erti<;ement and sale] may be probative 
·with respect to the nature of the material in question (57)." 
The Court has upheld far less stringent standards for obsce-
nity· sold to minors {58). However, possession of ob5cenity 
in private without any attempt to sell or distribute it is 
constitutionally protected as part of the prot~tion of free 
speech combined withca concern over the right o:f privacy. 
"Whatever the power of the state to control public di<;semi-
nation of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot 
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of 
controlling a person's private thoughts. (59)." 
Problems of freedom of expression extend beyond the 
content of speech to the manner and place where persons may 
speak. The general principales . which g-overn decisions were 
stated b~- former .Justice Goldberg when he was on the Court: 
There is a proper time and place for even the most pea-
cef1tl protest 01zd a plain duty a11d responsability on the 
(53) Pickering v. Board oi Eclur:c:ti.on, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
{54) Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). 
(55) ld. crt 487, n. 20.; Manual Enterprisoo v. Day, 310 U.S. 
· (56) ]acobeilis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1%1); A Book Named «John Cle-
Jand"lf Memoirs of a Woman oi Plea:rure• v. Attomey Genral ot Massacbusetf:l, 
383 u.s. 413. 419-20. 
(58) Ginsburg v. New Yor.C, 390 U.S. 629 {1958). 
(59) Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). 
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part of all citizens to obey all ·valid laws and regulatim1s. 
There is an equally plain requireme11t for laws and 
. reuulations to be drmcn so as to git:e citizens fair warning 
as to what -is illegal ; for rcuu.lation of conduct that invol-
ves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad 
i1~ scope ns tn stifle. Pirst Amendment freedoms, which 
'need breathing space to survive' N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 ; for appropriate limitations on the 
discrefion of public officials where sprech o11d ossembly 
m:.e i-ntertwined zcith u_qulatt:d ctmduct._: oild for all such 
lau.Js and regulations to be llp]1licd 1cith 1m eqzwl hand (60). 
The JIJ,assive peaceful demonstrations throughout the Uni-
ted States. and especially in Washington against the war in 
Viet- N am ·and the· polides of- the .. Presid€nt ·demonstrate-the .. 
effectiveness of this commitment to public assembly {61). 
~-\.lthough problems have occurred in civil rights demonstrations 
in~the South, the Court has been quick to protect the rights 
of the -demonstrato:rs. For example, a silent demogstration 
·in a public library (62) and a noisy one near a courthouse (63) 
was permitted, although clcmonstrations on jail gronnds (6-!J 
have been prohibited. The. Court has held that a4mll.llstn;tiye 
standards which vest great discretion in the administrative 
authority are invalid, for the standards must be narrowly 
drawn 1:o assure that the denial of a permit is not based on dis-
taste for the speaker's ormarrlwr's point of vew {65). Neverthe-
less, when an injunction is issued against the demonstration, 
even thougn the J.njunetion is based on an improper statute 
or adminic;trative rule, the injunction ·must not be ignored but 
must he appealed so long as there i<> time to do so (66). 
(SO} Cor·v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, ?74 {l$S) • 
. (61) The processes for peaceful assembly to protet governmental policy 
broke down during pe De:nocratic National Convention in Chicago, llllnoi.s in 
1958. See Mailer, Miami and · tbe Siege o1 Chicago. City officials denied per· 
:mOts to demonstration !eade:s. -Neverthele"..s, people came to Chicago in large 
numberz and ·a riot e""=ued. The legal consequences oi the events oi .Chicago 
are still m ·the courls. Conviction of ·five of t.'>a leaciers of the de!Ilonstrc:tion 
for « crossing. tate lines with intent to incite a riot ,. is on oppeal 1o ihe United 
States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. United. States :v. DeWnger. The trial 
received. widespread attention and the processes of t.lc>e court were subjected 
to g::<;at criticism. The seven defendants and their lawyers were fourl(i in 
contempt ~~ court, bUt that sentence is also on appeal. 
(62) Brown v. Lou-isiana, 3S3 U.S. 131 (1960). 
{63) (;'ox v. Louisiana, supra note 60. But the Court's opinion was based 
-on ihe . indications .c! Louisiana pollee that petitioners had ·not come too near 
the courthoilse would . be valid. 
{64) Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 {1956). 
(65) Sbuttle.sworlh v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
(66) Wall:er v. City ol Birmingham, 388 U.S. 3Ul (1967). 
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The rig-ht of free specrh, particularly with reference to 
the regnlntion of the nmmrcr of its exercise, is intimately 
eonnect<'fl with the rig-llt of assodation. ••Jt is hcvond debate 
that frect1om to engag-e in association for the ~dvanccment 
of beliefs and idea.<> i<> an iitseparahle aspect of the "liberty" 
assured h.'- the Due Pro(~l·ss Cl.:tusc of the Fourteenth Amend-
lll('llt, whidt embr;1ers fn:cdom of spe<>ch (f,'j) ." "TJwr·e are 
tiuH's and eit'l·umst:mees when states may not compel members 
o[ :,:ToHps r-ngage•.l in the dissemination of ickas to be publicly 
itlcntificd, Bates v. Lilfle Rock, 3£1 U.S. 516 ; N.A.A.C.P. v . 
. _llabama, 3;j7 U.S. -±49, 4()2. The reason for those htlldings 
was tlmt i<1cntifieation an(t fear of reprisal mi15ht deter perfec-
- -tl-y ·pt'aeeful dism"l'sions- of r'ublic nfattei-s Of impottance T68) ." 
Similar])·, a statt:· statute rl·quiring all teac-hers to list all org-a-
nisations to which they llelong- was im·alidated (69). Finally, 
the Court held _that the activi-ties of the ~L\.A..C.P. in asso- . 
dating Jor purposes of litig-ation were protected by the First 
Amendm<>nt .and ·rnuld not be baned as in1proper solicitation 
of legal lmsiness (JO). 
C. - FREED03f OF RELIGIOX 
C'loseJy connected \vith freedom of expression is the 
concept ... of -freedom of :religion. This includes freedom to 
believe as one wishes and to he free from state pressures to 
induce a particular belief. The Constitutiou bars the enact-
ment of any· law .:respecting the estahlishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof (71)." 
.A notary public cannot be denied his commission because 
l1c refuses to df'clare that he hclic..-cs in God (7~). A state 
cannot dPny unemplo~"ment benefits to a ScYmth Day Adven-
tist 'Who -refuses to take a joh offered her whlch requires her 
to work on Saturua)·, her sahhath (73). Congress has exemp-
tetl from service in the armed forces persons who by reason 
(67} .National Association lor the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama 
•z rei Patterson., 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
!68J Talley "· Caliiomia, 362 U ."S. 60, 1>5 (1960). 
(69} Shelton. v. Tucker, 364 U.S. -479 (1960). 
{70) NAACP "· Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See al&o Brotherhood ol B.R. 
Trainmen . :V. Virginia, sn u.s. 1 {1964). 
(71} U.S. Const. amend. 1. 
(72} Tor=so v. Watl:ins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961}. 
731 Sherbert v. Verner. 374 U.S. 398 (19631. 
of theh· "religious" training and helicf are consc-ientiously 
opposed to rartiripation in war in anv form. The Court 
eonstrncfl thi.'> statute to nvoiJ conflict wlth First Amendment 
rrqnir·eml·nts. It held that the individuals lwforc it qualified 
for the cxPutption, stuting that the test for "'rdi:.dous trninin~ 
atHl hc1id" '"as "docs the daim to belief occupy the same vlace 
in the life of tllC objeetor as an orthodox belief in God holds 
in the life of one elcari~· qualified for the exemption {74)." 
"That section exempts from military service all those whose 
consciem·r·s, SJH11Ted by deeply..:held moral, ethical, or religiow~ 
"beliefs, '\\:Oi1ld- ~i,""e- them·· no reSt· -or ·t'>eftee if. they allo•re<i _ 
thcm-sdYes to hrcome a pa!'t o:E an instrument o£ ·war (75) ... 
. T~c Court has faced man:-- difficult problems involving 
the estahlishment of,rrliginn. It held 1.mconstitutiona1 a state 
J)rogram ,\-l1ich permitted churches to offer religious classes 
in the sf'110ols to those chilrlrcn ''nose parrnts requested such 
instruction (16''. Simi1:n-1y invalit1atcd •rere tlw 11se of a 
non-tlenominational prayer (77) or readi11g-s fl'Om the Bihlc . 
at the start of the school day (78). Rut the public payment 
for Sl'l'nlm· tt'xthooks in Y'-'1ig-ions schools has heen upheld {79), 
all(l the tax rx.-·mption for <'hnrch property has also ·with.~oocl 
ehnHrng-P in the courts (80). 
D. - C'ITIZEXRIIIP .A..'\D THE RIGHT TO TRA VET .. 
'< 
Tho Constitution proclaims that "All persons born or 
nan1ra1izrd in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States (81)." It was not 
until reccntl;--, however, that it was determined that the State 
rna~· not take citizenship away. Previously, the expatriation 
of an indi·dtlual who votrd in a foreign deetion ·and remained 
in a fOl'{'ign country to m·oid military seniec was upheld (82). 
At tbe same time, the Court held that the 1)cnalty of depriva-
(74) United States v. Seeger. 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965). 
('lS) Welsh v. U~ted Stales,. 398 U.S. 333 {1970). 
(76) Illinois e:r rei McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). But 
it permitted students to leave school !or a portion ol the day to receive reli-
gious Instruction elsewhere. Zorac:h v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
fn) Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
(78) School District ol Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 -U.S. 2ll3 (1963). 
(79) Board ol Educ:alion v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
(90) Wab: v. New Yorl: City .Tar CommiSsioners, 397 U.S. 664 {1970). 
(81) U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
(82) Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
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tion of citizenship for military desertion was a "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" in violation of tl1e Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution (83). Si.'< years later the Comt held that to dena-
turalize n liaturalizcd citizrn for residimr in the land of his 
birth offends due process (84). Finally, three years later the 
Court said : · 
The 1.:ery nature of our fru government mal·rs it comple-
tely i-ncongrous to have a rule of latu und(r tchi,}z. a gro·uz; 
of citize1ts if.mporarily in office nm deprivP nnother grrntp 
of citizws of their citizenship. We hold that the Four~ 
teenth Amendment 1/'as designed to, and does, protect eve-
ry citizen of tl~is nation against a cougressional forcible 
d_P.§!Iucfiq~ __ qf_lti§. __ Qitizcnship .(85.1 · 
Part of the significance of citizenship lies in the right to 
trawl. In 1868, the Court, after noting the rights of the go-
vernment to servif'es from its citizens, stated correlative rights . 
of the citizen': 
He has f]zp, right to come to the seat of govermnent to 
assert any cla1:m he 1111/!} 1tave ·upon the got•ernment, or 
to tra?ISact any busiuess he 1na.y hat'e w-ith it... He has 
a right to free access to its sea-ports, ... to the sub-treasu-
ries, the lm1d offices, the revemte offici'S, and the courts of 
just-ice in the stveral States. and this right ·is in its n(lf1tre 
£ndependnzt of the 1~·ill of ail!f State over whose so1-"l he 
must pass in the exacice of it (86). 
That opinion declared unconstitutional a t~-.:: on persons 
leaving the state. Serenty years later, a statute penalizing· 
persons who aid the entrance of ind!gents into the state 'vas 
held unconstitutional. The Court said there is a "prohibition · 
against attempts on the part of any single state to isolate 
itself from difficulties common to an of them by restraining 
the transpo1iation of persons and propert~- across its bor-
ders (87)." On the basis of this principle. a century after 
first stating- the travel rights of Fnitcd States citizens, tJ1e 
Court held unconstitutional state statutes which required 
applicants for welfare to rrside in the state for a year before 
being eligible for assistance (88). 
{83) Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
(84) Schneider V, Rus1r, m u.s. 163 (!954). 
(95) A!royL"!l v. Ruslc, 387 U.S. 253, 268 {1967). 
(B6} Crandali v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1868). 
(87) Edwcmis v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (19·U). 
(SSJ Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
. - '~ '.,. 
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Another a~ct of the right to travel is the right to leaTe 
the cmmt:ry. "The right to traxd is a part of the 'liberty' of.,.· 
which the citir.en cannot he deprived 1\ithout due process of 
· law '(SD) ." The Comt ruled that the Secretary o:f State hag 
no auth0rity. under existing statutes t!i deny passports to 
citir.ens because of their beliefs or associations (90). A later 
statute nwking it unla·wful for a member of a communist 
organization to apply for or use a passport was hdd to be 
uncoiL.;;titutional because it was not suffieiently '"narrowly 
drawn to preYent the supposed evil (91)." The Secretary 
of State may refuse to validate passports for travel to specific 
places (92), but no. criminal penalties .exist for persons who 
travel in areas for which their _p~sport is 11ot validated (93). 
II. - Crinrlnalj:ustice 
# 
Guarantees of full and effective participation in govern-
ment arc not enough. A democratic government can also 
destroy hnman rights. The need for protection ag-ainst arbi-
trary goTernmental action is greatest in the criminal law 
process. Th,··J mnjn~· trends dominatf de,cJopments. in law 
enforcc:m.:nt ~1uring the past two c1cNtdcs. First, the spe1'ific 
Constitutional limitations on the federal government's power 
contained in t.he first .eight ~~mendments .have been constru(!d 
to appl;- to the States as the "due process" which mlist be 
afforded h1· the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Second, an· affirmative. oblirwtion has been placed -on the state . 
to eliminate many of the disadYantages .caused by the poverty· 
of an at'cnsed criminal defendant. Finally, tP,e Court has 
increasingly interpreted the Constitution to restrir.t the pO'fer .. 
of law enfort'emf'nt agrncies to disturb the. dignity and pri-
vacy of indinduals 
A.- ARREST 
An arrest is unlawful unless the state or federal arresting 
officer has ''probable cause" to believe that the person arrested 
(ll9J Xent "· Dul1e11, '$1 u:s. 11&; 125 (1959). 
(!10) Id. 
(91) Apth~er Y, Secretary ot State, .supra note ~­
(92) .Zemel v. Husf, 381 U,p. 1 (1965). 
(93j 'Unllei:l StateS ,;, Latib, 385 U.S. 475 (1967). 
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has committed a ·crime (94). "Probable cause exists if the 
facts and circumstances known· to the officer warrant a pru-
dent man is belieYing that the offense has been committed (9~}." 
This requirement has been rigidly enforced. ·where the arr-est 
is pursuant to an arrest warrant, the information on whlch 
the warrant was based must state the facts which eonstjtute 
probable cause, iucntifying the source of the information: If . 
the information is not hnsed on the VfTsonal observation of 
the officer appl}--ing for the wnnant, hr must give the original 
source of thr information nnu reasons why the informant is 
to be believed (96). Thr right to resist ·without weapons an 
unla"iul arrest ·is generally recognized (97}. There are also 
.. ciyil a!_ld crh}1in~l st~t~ntes_ againts. persons makiiJ.g unla:'\Yf11l 
arrestc;. But these remedies lmTe not been completly effec-
tive (98i. The Court has attempted to stop such unlawful p-rac-
tices by barring the use in criminal eases of any information or 
evidence ohtainC'd as a result of an un1awful.arrest (99). 
, 
B. - SEARCH ..A..:.\'D S"EIZrRE 
. The law of arrest is closely tieltl to that of search and 
seizure. E:s:~~ept where it is impossible io ohtain a search war-
rant hef-oJ·p the i'YlOC'TI!'e will he moYed or destroy{'<l (100), a 
search >Yithout a search \Ynrrant is vn lic1 only if pu;'Snant to a 
linvful arl'est {101). Even then. the !';Parch must he r<'il.sonn-
ble (102) and extend only to the person of the defenrhmt 
. and the area .. from ''-ithin which he might gain possession 
{94) Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; .i;er v; California, 374 
u.S. 23 [1963). . 
(95) Henry .v. United States, 351 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). 
(96) Gfordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 {1957) ; Aguilar v. Texas. 
378 u.s. 103 {1964). . 
{97) See ·p>.U!S!:N and -KADisll. Crir.:incl Law· end Its Processes 536 (1969). But 
c;rt [east six states _prohibit such r<>sistance. Che·;igny. « Tne'· Right to Resist 
an Unlawful Arrest,» 78 Yale L.J. llZB. 1133 (1969). Note. Cri.:ninal Law : Tl:e 
Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest : An Out-Dc!ed Concept, 3 Tulsa -L.J. 46 (!9661 ; 
People v. Cherry, 307 N.Y. 308 (1954).; United States v. Dme, 332 U.S. SB! 594 
{1948). ' 
(9S) Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights 39 Minn 
L. Rev, 493 (1955). Note, Philad~lphia Police Practice and the bw 'at Arre;t;. 
100 U. ot Pa. L. Rev. 1182, 1206-12 (\952) ; LA FAv~. Arrest, The Decision to Take 
A Suspect into Custody, 412-25 (1965). · 
{99) Wong Sun, supra note 94. 
{100) Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) ; McDonald v. United States 
335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948) ; Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden 387 U.S. z94 (1967). . • 
(101) Chime] v. Caluornia, 395 U.S. 346 (1957}, 
(102) See X,remen v. United Slctf!'3. 353 U.S. 346 ~1957). 
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of a weapon or t1et-1ructible evidence." (103). Like the arrest 
warrant, the se;1rd1 warrant must he ba~rd on "probahle 
cause" ascertaint:;J from facts supplied the magistrate issuing-
the warrant (]0-l). It must particularly describe "the place 
to he searched, an•1 the pers011s ot· things to be seized" (10:1). 
The prohibition against "'unreasonable searches and seizu-
rc·s" (lOG) a]•pliPs to the states as well ns the federal gowm-
mcnt (107'1 : :mtl..ct'Yi•knee srem·t'd unlmrfTilly eannot he usrcl 
b~- the state against a nefmclant ·(108). 
The protettion of the home against unreasonable seawhcs 
has also hecn a1h-anced by decisions lw1ding that the Constitu-
tion rcctuires a sem·dt warrant for an administrative search of 
··the home {100) ·fir phwe of bu.<iillCss (110) as-wcll-as-for searehcs 
under the criminal law. However. the opinions recognizP<1 
that the '"prohahl<' cause" required for a health or safety 
inspeetion would he less than that required for a search for 
criminal activit:· and • .might be satisfied hy a showing that the 
area had not recently been inspected. · 
C. - E..:\ VESDROPPING AND WIRETAPPING 
The d<'YE>lopment of wiretappillg and Plectronie caws-
dropping •ll'Yiel'S hf,,·e presented llC\Y and romplex prohlcrns 
for the -pn·srlT.ation of the seeurity of tlw Jl(>l'Ron and property 
of individuals. Evidence secured through a listening device 
attached to tbe person of a. police inform~mt '"ho entered the 
premises at the invitation of the owner has hcen held admi<>-
sible (111). But the Court indicated at an early date that the 
plachig of a li'ltming device on another's premises by tres-
pass violated the Fourth Amendment (112), and the Comt 
(103) Chime!, supra note 101. 
(104) Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) ; Aguilar v. Texas, supra 
note 96. 
(105) U.S. Cons!. aml!nd. IV. 
(106) U.S. Cons!. amend. IV. 
(107) Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
(lOS) Mapp v. Ohio, :367 U.S. 643 (1961). Not applied retroactively. Link· 
letter v. Walker, :381 U.S. {1905). 
(109) Camara v. Municipal Court oi the City and County o1 Sa!J Francisco, 
381 u.s. 523 (1967). . 
(110) See v. City of· Seattle, 387 U.S. 451 (1967). 
(111) On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) ; but xnore recent cases 
suggest that the court may only allow such recordings to corroborate the tes-
timony of a witness. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 4Z7 (1963) ; Orbom v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). 
(112) Irvine v. Calilontia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). 
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excluded evidence obtained by a spike mike which ,had been 
drivrn into a party wall (113). Finally, the Court held that the 
u.•:;e of electronic dc,·ices to capture a conversation is a "search'" 
under the Fr>nrth Amendment, and tl1at the "probable cause" 
and spccifitity requirements of a warrant are applicable (1'14), 
whether or not any trespass oceurs (115). 
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 
which prohibited the una.uthorized interception and divul-
gence of any communication by \Yire was construed to bar 
the usc of wiretap evidence obtained by federal {116) or 
state (117) officers in federal or state (118) court. A 1963 
statute now permits court- approved wiretapping to investigate 
·eertain ·crimes- (119), hut--the. recent .. decisions .on electr.on:ic. 
surveillance har:e made it clear that ·wiretapping is a "search 
and seizure" regu1at.cd by the Fourth Amendment of the Cons-
titution (120) . 
D. - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The Constitution provides that "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to .;. the· assistance 
of counsel for his defense." (121). Since 1938 it has been 
recotrnizcd that in all federal criminal cases, the accm;ed i3 
entitled to have counsel furnished by the government if he 
isunablc to pay for one (12:.;). But in 19-!2 the Court heM 
that due 11rocess did not require states to :fumish counsel 
in non-capital cases (12~). The. validity of this decision was 
undermined when the Court held that a state violated the 
equal protection elause in refusing to provide indigents with 
a free transcript on which to base their appeal (124).. Two 
decades after announcing that states need not furnish counsel 
to indigents, the Court reversed itself and said that the appoin-
(113) Silverman v. UI!ited States, 365 U.S. S05 (1951}. 
(114) Berger v. Stcte of New Yorl:, 3B8 U.S. 42 (1967). 
(ll5) Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
(115) Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 {19.;''7). 
(117) Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 {1957). 
(118) Lee v. Florida, 391 U.S. 378 (1968). 
(119) 18 U.S.C., § 2516. 
(120) lCatz v. United States, aupra note 115 . 
. (121) .U.S. Cons!. amend. VI. 
(122) Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Walh>r v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). The statutory provision for providing counsel In federal courts is 18 
U.S.C., I S3006 A. . 
(123) Bett:r v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). 
n':IA\ r....tm" w mlnni• liS! U.S. 12 119551. 
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tmcnt of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was a 
fundamental right essential to a fair trial. 
From the bcginniug, our state and national constitu-tions 
and lint'S Jurl'e lnid great emphasis on procedural and 
substm1tive safeguards-designed to assure fair trials before 
imparfirr7 tribunals in which every defendant stands equal 
btfore- thr. law. Th·is 1wbie ideal cmznot be t·ff17ized if 
the pour man charged zrith crime hns to face his acc-users 
u·itJwut a lawyer to assist him (125). 
Counsel must also be provided the indigent defendant 
for hi<> appeal from a conviction (126). 
The :right to co.unsd .attaches_prior to triaL The. police 
violate the defendant's right to counsel if they refuse his 
request to see hi'l attorney while he is in tlle police station 
for questioning (12'7). A suspect is also entitled to have 
counsel present when he is shown to ,\itnes.o;;es in a "lineup" 
for identification' (128). 
E PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRil\'IlNATION 
"Xo person ... shall be compelled in any criminal ease to 
be a witness against himself." {129). 
{ C] onvictions follou;ing the admission into evidence of 
confessions which a·re involuntary, i. e., the prod·Hce of 
coercion, either physical or psycho7ogicnl, wnnot sfatld. 
This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to 
be tnce bu.t because .the methods 1fsed to extract thent 
offend and nnderly·ing principle in the enforcement of our 
criminal law ; that ours 1·s an accusator£al and not an 
inquisitorial system~ system in which the State must 
esta07ish guilt by evidence independently and freely 
SPC1tred rrnd moy 11ot by coerdnn prnve its charge against 
an acc1tsed mtt of his mouth (130). 
Ph;rsical coercion by federal or state officers is clearly 
prohibited (131). fl';ychological coercion, while also foi·bidilen, 
(125) Gideon v. Wainwriab!, m U.S. 335, 344 [1963). Applied relroactively 
eg., Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 {1954). 
(126) Douglas v. California, '572 U.S. 353 (l963). 
(127) E.7cobedo v. Illinois, 378 UcS. 478 {1964). 
(128) .United States v. Wade, 3B8 U.S. 218 (1967}. 
(129) U.S. Const. emend. V. ' 
(130} llogezs v. llicbmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
(131) .Brown "· MWU;sippl, 'JSl U.S. 218 (1936). 
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is mo1·1' di ffieult to drtt'Yminc. Cases in whi<:h the Oourt 
fountllmluwful psyc:hologital coercion include thirty-six hours 
of unintcrruptcu twestioning (1:32), fh·c lvmrs intrrrog-ation 
of a iift('ell :n.•ar old bo~· (J 3J), nine consceutive hum-s questio-
ning of a mentally ill individual (]:1-:l:), and the refusal to 
permit a nwn to tdt·p]t.,Jle his \\·ifc until he eonfPssed (135). 
The (liffil'nlty of dt>t,···!ninilt!! 'Y11dhrr :1 f•onfc·ssion was compel-
led by psycholo0ed cocn·ion or givc:tl voluntarily is obvious. 
A stanilunl ·whidl Ilu • .:tu<ltl'U \';ith the indi.-iJual's ability to. 
withstand ps:n.:hological pressures could provide little guidance 
for prop{'r police eonduct. The incrrasi11g concern of the 
IJ_gurt -~() prennt police usc of measures of :psychological 
COffilJUlsion aguinsf .. SUSpects- combined -,,-ith the principle- of 
the ·~rig-ht to com1sel" cases that the poor and ignorant should 
1-ccein:· the same treut;nent from the lmr as the wealthy and 
eclnc-uted resulted in the formulation of a set of rules by the 
Court. ' 
{'VJ hrn a·n ·it•di·ridual is tahen into cu.stody or otherwise 
depril.'Nl of his :frrol'llll by the authorit-ies in M1JI signifi-
crud 'it·ay rmd ·is .subjectul to questioning, thr pr·iv11ege 
ayainst sc!f -·l:11crim i; .. rrf rm1 is jcopilrilizr:cl ... He mnst be 
wnnwZ prior to 111lJI quest-i.rming, that h.e lws tlle right 
tv rn11ain silent. thut auythiuy he say:> can be nscd 
against him iJt a £'!!IU'f of luw. fl,Jf h ],,!~ f!,,· ri!1i1! fo the 
JH'aC}ICt uf an flli';J'iiC!J, and flwf if he cmwot nf!ord an 
affori1f!J one wm be n.ppniHfrd for l!illl prior to f'11!J ques-
fio:•inrJ ;f llr sn d, _,.:rs. O]i?"-'rhmif!J to e.r.crci.w• fhr-.~c 
ri!flifS m11st bt nf•·rdrd Mill tlm•i(_(J;ililtf flu: idcrrogl!t-iO·Jl. · 
. .lf+u BIICh 1''1:1'11 [,, fjS llflrC Ju'ni yh·r.n, 1111d Sl!ch nppnr-
flrnil!t nfforif,if l1im. nu~ i11d·iv<'dmtl may hrl}wiiltPv m1d 
·iNfdlitfCJltly wnit·c fhc.'" ~·ights n1:d rr._nrcc tn answer qnPs-
fions m· mrrkr n. sfatcmhd. B1d -nn!css 1111d nnfil snch 
warnings and waiver arc demonstrated by the proscc·u.tion 
nf trial, no n·idn1cr 1Jbtnh1Hl aR a result of infcrro!Jation 
COil be used (t{!flinst him (1~6). 
CoeJ-r·ion to ohtain sclf-inerimin:1tin ~~ stat{~nwnts is not 
limited to the pol in: station. Inv<'stigations h_v- grana juries· 
or l<>g-i!-;latiw (•ommitte<'~ may require the trstimony of a wit-
ness. HefnStll to ::mswer may he punished. Dut if a responsive 
(132) khcrait v. Tcnn.,.ssee, 322 U.S. 143 (1943). 
(133) Haley v. Oruo, 332 U.S. 4.96 (1948). 
(134) Blacl:bourn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). 
(135) Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). 
(136) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 4.36, 478-79 (1966). These rules do not 
Clpply retroactively. John#on v. New Jersey, 364 U.S .. 719 (1966). 
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nHs\n·r to a question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
U!lS\\Pred. mi~ht furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed 
to lll'u.-;eeutc criminally, the \\'itness may assert his privilege 
llf!ain~t self-im·rimination (1l:l7). 'rhe privill:'gc protects a state 
·witness agaiust ilH:riJ:Jination under federal as '\Y{'ll as state 
la\\", alt•l a. f.t•dt•ral "·itness agairu;t incrimination und\'r statt-
as well as federal ltH\. (1!38). \Yherc thE' sanction Ior refusal 
to testify at an irHJttir}; is dismissal from a government posi-
tioiJ,, sucl1 testimony is considered "'coinpelled" and may not 
he used against the witnrss in a criminal prosecution (139). 
Furtlwr,. m;=;t'rtiun of the .:privikgc crumot-JJe made ground fox 
disbarment (140) or dismissal from a public teaching position, 
(141) unless the questions specifically relate to the perfot·-
man(~e of offic'ial dutiPs (142). '"'~he privilege against self-
incriminatic.n \I01Jlrl be reduc.:d to a hollovt mockery if :its 
exerc-ise could be taken as equi,·alent either to a confession of 
guilt or a conc1usiYc vresumption of perjury (143)"'. Comment 
nt t1·ial b~~ the prnseeut01· on the failure of the accused to 
testif~- is forbiddcJt hc•raust: it penalizes ~he assertion of tb .. 
priYiiege (1-1-!). 
F.- TIAIL 
The imprisonment of an individual prim· to trial rPsu1ts 
in puni<;lunent prior to a determinatio11 of guilt. To amelio-
rate this <·onclitirm, most states gu:n-:mtec a rig-ht to lmil sd 
in eYer~· 11011-capital f•:JSI'. The amount 'of hail must JJ•1t he 
excessiw (145), and stnmln1·t1s f01· fixing it in federal cmws lll't> 
:-:et p1·n·snant to tlw P.nil Heform Aet of 1%6 whose stated pur-
pose 1s : 
- ... to assure that all i•<'t-sons t•egnn1ks of finaneial statue, 
shall not JH'N11rssl~- be r1etainN1 prlH1ing tlwh· :rpppat·ance 
to an~m-,,r eh:J.rg···s, to testi+~-, fll' !Wnding- appeal, whcll 
1letention SC'n-Pc1 ndther the ends of justi('C nor tlw puhli!! 
interest (1-l6) ." 
(137) Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1954). 
(138) Murphy v. Watelront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1954). 
(139} Garrity v. New Jersey, 3S6 U.S. 493 (1967). 
(140) Spevaclc v. Xlein, 385 U.S. 5!1 (1967). 
(141} Slo::hower v. Board ol Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956}. 
U42J Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
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An important development has been the increasin..,. -use of 
"pre-trial parole" wh~;rc the accused is freed on his o'~n reco-
gnizan~e if the facts suggest that it is unlike~y he will attempt 
to escape being tried (147). -
G.- SPEEDY TRIAL 
The accused is entitled to be speedily brought to 
trial (148). He may p,ot be left languishing in jail or even 
free on bail for an unreasonable length of time. Even when 
__ ~he_ aCGUScd is released without bail because the prosecutor has 
filed a nolle prose:qui (rCiiisal to pi·osecute -at this tiine\against 
the wishes of the defendant, the rig-ht to a_ speedy trial ,prevents 
the state from later rearresting him and trying him on the 
same charge (149) . •. 
H.- A FAIR TRL~ IN A F--UR TRIBu'XAL 
· The Fourteenth ,Amendment to the United States Cons-
titution provides in part' : "nor shall any /State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, ·without due process Qf 
la\v {150) ". An j~np9_rtant trend oi the past two decades has 
been the construction :oi this ::elause to make effective against 
the States other amendments which restrained federal action 
(151). But the requirement of due process has its ow"ll content 
as well. "'A fair triaLin a fair tribunal is a basic requirement 
of due process (152)." 
Sustained PI"ejudici;1.l pulJlicity prior to trial may make 
it impossible to obtain.· an impartial jury . (153). · The judge 
must transfer the venue to another jmiqdietion where passions 
are not so inflamed {)r eol1tinile the case 1mtil the effect of the 
publieit~r hits h~n ·{liss:i1>ated (154). He must isolate the jury 
(147) AREA, Ranxin and .Snmz, :The Manhattan Bail Project : An Interim Be-
pot! on the Use of Pre-Trio! Parole, S8 lLY.U.L.Q. fil (1953). 
(148) U.s. Const. mnenli. -V:I. · ' 
(149) Klopfer v. State,.of N,or!h. C<:rrolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1957). 
(150) U.S. Canst. amend. )(IV. . . .. 
(151) Gi!low v. New 'fori:, ~ U.S. 652 (1925) (1st 'mnend.): Vlo1!, BUPr<X n0~~--
107, Mapp, supra no!e 10~. <!Cer, supra note -94 (4th mnend.,): Mailoy, supra .nOte 
137 (lith omend.) ; G1deol1; ,:supra ~;~ole. 125; ICJopler, supra note 149 (6th amend.~._ 
(152) In ze .MuclliSon, ::149 u.s: i33, 136 (1954).- ·· · · •·· ·· .. •·. · 
(153) Th& defendant is 'entitled to trial by b jury of his peer..; U.S. ~( :, 
Art. .UI and Amend. Vl. . _ 
(IS4J Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S •. 717 (1961)~ 
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from the effects of newspaper and radio reports during the 
trial (155), and the televising of a criminal proceeding is for-
bidden {156). Any limitation on spectators and newsmen at 
the trial must be applied "IYith regard to the defendant's cons-
titutional right to a "public trial" (157). 
The accused is entitled to an unbiased judge (158)~. The 
jury, too, must be impnrtial (159). ~omvhitcs cannot be· 
convictcr1 b:v· a jur::· if the state limits jury service to 
white (160). The Court has reversed munerous convictions be-
cause of subtle dic:;criminatory jury selection procedures (161). 
Similarly, the state may not maintain racial segregation in the 
.court. {162).-
The accused is also entitled to fairness on the part of the 
prosecution. It may not knowingly use perjured testiillony 
·or knowingly mislead the jury as to a material fact (163). It 
cannot suppress 6xculpatory evidence which would assist the 
defendant in his case (164). 
Another protection ·of the accused's right to a fair trial is 
the requirem€nt of the Si. ... -th }unendment that he "be confron-
ted with the witnesses against him" (165). This has been 
construed to apply to the states. 
In one case. the petitioner w·as com-icted on eYid.cnce which 
included statements of a witness made at a preliminary hea-
ring at wllieli the petitioner was present without counsel. The 
witness· "~as not a>nilable at the trial. The Court held that 
in the ahsence of counsel petitioner did not have a constitu-
tionall:v· adequate right to cross-examine the witness and that 
the right to confront thr v;itness includes the right to cross-
(ISS) Sheppard v. Maxw-ell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
(156) Estes v. Texas, 38! U.S. 532 (!965). 
(157) U.S. Cons!. =end. VI. Red Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 {!948). 
(!58) See Tumey v. Ob.io, 273 U.S. 510 (!9Z7) where conviction for illegal 
po3session of in~oxication liquor was r-eversed because the jc.dge was cornpen-
scrted from the fines paid by convicted persons. 28 U.S.C. sec. 144 provides : 
c \Vhenever a par!y to =Y proc-oedinq ma!:es and files a timely and suf.icient 
affidavit that the judge before whcm the matter is pending has a personal bias 
or prejudice eit.'ler aqainst him or in l:::rvor ol any adverse party, such judge 
ahal! proceed no further therein, but another judge .shall be assigned to hear 
such proceeding. ~ 
(159) U.S. Canst. amend. VI Remmer v .United States, 350 U.S. m {1956). 
(160) Strauder y. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
(161) Norris v. Alabama, 29~ U.S. 587 (1935) ; Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 
(1952) ; Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964). 
(162) Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963). 
(163) Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
(164) Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
(165) U.S. Con.st. amend. Vl. 
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examine him (166). But if the defendant's conduct ic; greatlv 
disruptiw of the trial, the judge can eontinur trial '~i.thmit 
. him until he promises to behave, can punish him for contempt 
or ordrr him hound and gagged (167). 
I. - DOUBLE .JBOPARDY 
" ••• JHW shall an~· person he suhjcet for the same o:ff('n.<:;e . 
to be twi<'P put in jC'Opardy of life or limb (168)." 
Thf' State with all its r.esmtrces and power should not be 
c(lllOil'Cd to 1nal;c +epeated attemptJ; _to _convict _lilt all.IJ,qed 
offender, thereby S1lbjecting him to embarrassment, 
expense anrl ordenl and compelling him to lit•f in a cmdi-
mting state of an."C1-B(1J ancl f-nsecurity, as wdl as ndwncing 
the possib;?-ity that e-ven thmtgh ·innoce.11t he ma?f be fomul 
gw1ty (169 ). 
The Court has been zealous in its :protection of the incli-
vidual. ~.l..-comiction of murder in tl1e seeond degree was held 
to amount to an acquittal of murder in the first degree which 
precluded a new trial for the graver offense when the convic-
tion for the le~ser ofi't•nsc was on-l'tumcd (170). An at"quittn 1 
impropcr1:-· <li1w:te<l =~~- thH jwhc beeausc of prosccutorial 
misconduct "·as held to b?..r a nc·w trial (171 )_ Even when 
the jury ·was {l:i~ehar~cd before any te::.1:imony had been offered 
because tJH' prnsrf'ution failrd to issue a summons to its prin-
cipal witness. the Court held that the ddrnil.ant eould not 11e 
tried b:-;- a ~<'<•ona jury (112). This pi·ohihition against double 
jeopardy also prevents the states from trying an individual 
twice (173). · 
Nevcrthr1ess, the possibility of being tried twice for the 
same aet persists. An aef{nittal of a federal e1~imc does not 
bar rcprosecution for a ~tatt~ c1·ime although the factual ele-
ments of the crimes arc identical (174). Similar1)-, a state trial 
(166) Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 {1965). 
(167) liiinois v. Allen. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
(169) U.S. Cons!. amend. V. 
(169) Green v. United States, S5 U.S. 184. 187-88 {1957). 
(170) Id .. 
(171) Fang Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 n962). 
{172) Downum v. United States, :r!Z U.S. 734 (1963). 
(173) Benton v. Maryland, 395 U;S. 784 (1969). 
(174) Bortlcus v. 11Jinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), But acqulttai of municipal crime 
~ .teP!~"=:'!!on __ ~r--~ __ state crime .where elements are identical. Waller ··v. 
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for an offense does not bar a federal prosecution (175). This 
retrogressive state of the law has some prattical beneficial 
effects for human rights si11ce indiTiduals in the South who 
might be acquitted in the state courts or given mild sentences 
for offenses against rivil 1·ights workers are still subject to 
federal prosrention (1 76). 
J. - TJIMITATIO~S ON CRI.:.\IIN.AL STATUTES 
There· are numerous- constitutioiial-limitations on:· ·what 
conduct may be made criminal. ''Xo Dill oi Attainder or ex 
post fnct Law sh<Jll be pas.-,cd" (177). "No State shall ... pass 
any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto I.1a·w ... " (178). A statute 
must be sufficiently explicit to inform those subject to its pro-
visions what conduct on theii· part will render them liable to 
its penalties (179). The Court will reverse a conviction where 
the reeord :rewals no evidence of the defendant's guilt (180). 
Constitutional guarantees previously discussed, such as the 
right to free speech, protect certain conduct from criminal 
sanctions. The Court has also fuu11d a right of marital pri-
nlCy f·m~matiil~ from s.:vcral S1t6:iric constitutional guarantees 
which prevents a statt! from making the use of contracepti,·cs 
a criminal offense (181). The prohibition against· the inflic-
tion of "cruel and unusual punishment" (182) prohibits the 
enactTT1ent of laws punishing the status of an individual, e.g., 
drug addiction (183). · 
K. - PlJNISIIMENT 
The main concerns of the Court have been with the pro-
ce..c;ses of apprehension of a suspect and adjudication of his 
075) Abbate v. United .Stat<~!!, 359 U~S- 187 (1959). 
(176) United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1965). Defendants acquitted In 
state murder trial were later tried under federal law lor attempting to discou· 
109e negroes from entering the ,;tate .by the murder of a negro who had done 
ao. (177] U.S. Const Art. 1. sec. 9, cl 3. See U.S. v. Bxown, supra note C. 
(178) U.S. Const. Art I, sec. 10 
(179] See Lanzetta v_ New jersey, 305 U.S. 451 (1939) Invalidating a statute 
which made it a crime to be a member of a • gang ». 
(180) Gamer v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
{l81j Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
(182) U.S. Consl. amend. VIIL 
(183) liobinson v. Caliiomia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), But the Court upheld a 
conviction lor being found in a state of Intoxication In a publlc place. Powell 
.,., T~aos, 392 U.S. 514 (1968]. 
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guilt. The Court now may begin to concern itself with the 
treatment of persons convicted of crimes. .A. district court 
has already found thnt. conditions in one state prison where 
inmatt:::; were subj~e<:t to Yiolcnce and homosexual attacks from 
other inmates constituted "·cruel and unusual -punishment~' and 
ordered the state to improve cnndi).ions or close the -pri-
son (18-±). 
'Ihe Court is now facing a series of challenges by indigents 
to inequities resulting from jail or fine sentences e.g., $50 fine 
or ten days in jail. In the first -case this nature, the Court 
dealt_ with __ a sentence for the maximum term provided- by 
statute plus a fine permissible under- the statute. The· Court-
held that the indigent could not he macle to serve any addi-
tional time for his failure to pay the fine. "\\~ e conclude that 
when the aggregnte imprisonment·exceeds the maximum period 
fL--ced by the st:ltute and results directly from an involuntary 
nonpayment of a fine or court costs ·we are confronted with an 
impermi~sibLe di:-crimiuatitm that re..,ts on ability to 
pay {185) :" A eomp:.mion case was rcmandi;d to the lower 
courts beemse t11e state ltad changed the statute which was 
being ehnllan,Q"ed. Fonr of the nine judges in an opinion con-
currin<:: in the remand e:;:pres,;ed their opinion a<> to eases where 
the j;cil ter:2: st:lTcd for 1wnp3~·ment of the fine might be less 
than the jail semew~e which the court could ha-ve given ini-
tially for the crime. ~The constitution prohibits the State from 
imposing n fine as a scntrnec and then automatically ~onverting 
it into a jail term solel: because the defendant is indigent and 
cannot forth•>ith pay the fi~e in f~l" (186). 
L. - RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 
~<\1.'\"D :MILITARY PERSONNEL 
At least two categories of pcl'Sons have been historically 
denied mnny of the protections afforded by the Constitution. 
The juvenile court s:-stem was ado-pted under the theory that 
the state would take the role of the parent, and consequently 
procedural rights would not be available. However, the Court 
recently held that the due process clause requires delinquency 
adjudications to "measure up to the essentials of due -process 
(184) Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
(165) Willlazrur v. fllinou, m U.S. 235, 24G-l (1970) •. 
(186) Mon'U v. Schoonfieid, 399 U.S. SOS. 509 (1970). 
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and f<lir treatment" (187). The precise nature of the "essen-
tials'' i~ still being litigated. 
The rights of military personnel are protected by the 
Uniform Cone of :\Iilitary Justice: Congress ic; empowered 
·"To make mles for the Government and regulation of the 
land and naval forees." {188). ·whether other constitutional 
gnarantet·s ;we still applicable to militm·~- persmmel is liD-
clear (18!:1). The military courts have acted on the as.mmption 
that such .guarantees a;pply. but that the factual context of 
military life permits many infringements on liberty which 
would7.not ·be permissible if imposed -On-civilians (190}. 
III. - EQUAL PROTECTIOX OF THE LAWS 
, 
Respr·r.t for the law is based in part on the belief that the 
laws are iair and the society which they preserTe is just. The 
riots whieh han occured in the United States in recent years 
in Xe-..v York, New Jersey, :Michigan and California indicate 
that manT negroes in the United States don't believe in the 
fairnc--.~ of the l:n;- or the justice of the society .. The Four-
teenth Amt:EL1JHent guarantees to all persons the •~equal pro-·. 
· tection oi the laws." (191). Tlris JH'O'\'ision has, however, not 
been suffieim1t .to cope with deeply rooted social prejudice, 
and it hns ht>C'H neeess<ll":\' for the federal and state legislatures 
to aet against i·acial · di5;crimin~tion. Several developments 
in eliminating 1:acial discrimination have already been noted 
in the sections devoted to '\"oting, freedom of speech and 
assemhly, anl1 iair trial. 
The l'tlst twenty years have seen an abrupt reversal in the 
attiturle of ~n hranehes of government from toleration of racial 
discrimination to a resolve to eliminnte it. Previously, the 
Court had pennitted racial separation if the separate facilities 
were equal (192). This made each case a factual one of 
(187) ln lie Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
(188) U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8. 
(189) Compare AppliC'Crtion ol Stapley. 246 F. Supt>. 316 (D. Utah 1965) with 
Kennedy v. Commandant, United Stales Disciplinary Barroc±s, 258 F. Supp. 967 
(D. Kan 1960). · 
{190} United States "'· Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 155, -:rt C.M.R 429 (1967! upholding 
the conviction ol an officer for carrying a sign in a demonstration which 5aid 
« Let'li have l!lore than a choice between petty ignorant fascists in 1968 " and 
c End Johnson's fascist aggression in Vietnam. • 
{191) U.S. Canst. amend. XIV. 
{192) Pleuy Y. Fer:guson, 163 U.S. 5'¥1 (la96). 
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presenting masses of physical, social and psychological data 
to prove the facilities were not €qual-a task which few were 
'\v.illing and able to undertake. Begjnning in 1954 the Court 
found that classifications based on J"ace violated the equal 
protection clause. Thus, all that needed to be shown to im·a-
lidate the law was that the state separated the races. The 
Court ha.<> also been inerc!asing-ly willi11g. to find state parti!:i-
pation in raeial discrilllinntion rendering it illegal even thong-!1 
the .state involvement mt:;v· be minimal and indiJ"ect. Finall:·. 
the President and Congress during the last decade have taken 
an affirmative role by laws and exe€utive orders directed at 
eliminating discrimination . 
• -\.. - EDUCATION 
The best" known landmark in the str~ggle against racial 
segregation is Brown '1). Board of Education, (193) which held 
that segregation in public education is a denial of equal pro-
tection of the laws. "'To separate ··' [school children] from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their 
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the 
communitv·that maT affect their hearts and minds in a wa,-
unlikely ~,·cr to h~ undone" (194). States atto~mpted t'o 
avoid the effects of the Brou·n decision by closing public 
schools and using state or county funds to support directly or 
indirectly privately· owned schools which were segregated. The 
Court held this unconstitutional (19;1). Volunta-ry transfer 
plan.<> based on racial factors tending to perpetuate former 
segregation were inva:lidated (196). The Attorney flrneraJ was 
empowered by legislation to bring suits to int<'gTatc schools 
{193) ~7 U.S. 483 (19s.l). Brown was based on the equal protection clause 
of the Fourleenth Amendment, but in Boliinq v. Sharpe. 347 U.S. 497 (l!?s.l), the 
Court held that school segregation in the Ir.strict of Columbia where the Four-
teenth Amendment does not crp;:>ly was a violation of the due process clause 
o! the Fifth AI<lendment Since Brown, the Court has held segTega:tion uncons-
titutional in numerous other areas. including public beaches and bathhouses 
{Mayor of Baltimore v. D<TM>on, 350 U.S. 877 [1955]), municipal golf courses 
(Holmes v. Cily of Atlcmta, 350 U.S. 879 [1955]). b:.1ses (Gayle v. Browder, 
352 U.S. 903 {1956)), public parks {New Orleans City Park Development Ass"n. 
v. Defiege, 358 U.S. 54 [1959]). >=urjcipal audito:-iums (Shiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 
0964JJ. The repudiation in Brown oi the «separate but equal • doctrine Jed 
to the conclusion that race is not a valid basis !or classiliccrtion in a legislative 
enactment. Consequently. laws barrin:J interracial marr10ges o:re unconstitutional 
although they penalize both th .. white and the nonwhite. Loving v. Common-
wealth ol Virginia 388 U.S. l (1967). 
(194) Brown, supra :note 193 at -l94. 
(195) Sr. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall. 358 U.S. 515 (1962) : Griffjn 
Y, County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964}. 
(196} Goss v. Board ol Education, 373 U.S. 683 (~963). 
whencwr private persons were unable to do so (19i). Southern 
!lchools have long delayed intcg-r:Jtion, using the language of 
the Hrmc·n deeision-'"with all dclihen.Jte spced"-as an autho-
rization to stall, but the Court has said "continued operation,oi 
segregated schools under a standard of a1lowing 'all deliberate 
speed' for tlcsegrcgation is 1io longer constitutionaly permissible. 
(198). Some states in the deep South refuse to integrate 
unless orcl1•red by the Court in the local area. This means 
that a suit mnst he hrou,g-ht in each individual district in order 
to get the sehool in that dLstrict se~'Te::,>"Uted. The expenditure 
of manpower to obtai11 this end is enormous and progress has 
been Yer:~ slow~, The federal govemmcnt has failed to enact 
the ~nd of significant legislation ·which it enacted ·with respect 
to voting- rights. aii.d the·· rcsoi1rees of priYate groups such 
as the 1\.A.~\.C.P. Legal Defense Fund, Inc. which bear the 
primm~- brunt of the integration effort are quite limited. 
However, as· a result of the Court dcci<;ions, integration will 
be ordered in every case in the deep South . where a suit is 
brought. The <>:s:ecutivc, so far, has always been -..villing to 
enforce the court urders to prcn:nt anar1:ll;"- mu1 disrrsp{'Ct 
for sut:h orders. Thus, :although the process is slow and pain-
ful, inte:;ration \\ill eventually result (1991. It is hoped that 
additional resources will be devoted to the efforts to obtain 
integration in· the schools. 
The state polie:' of segregation in the South has its eoun-
terpart in "de facto" segregation in the North. Social and 
economic: disr-rimii1atiDn has resulted in negroes living in 
the same areas in large cities. Children are assigned to the 
school nearest them. Thus, v.ithin the C'it~\dde school system, 
one sehool may be prC'dominantly negro while the others are 
predominantl~' whitt>. The problem has not yet heen success-
fully resolved. The underlying job and housing discrimi-
nations which l<'ad to ghettos arc being attacked, but many 
lower eourts have ]wld that the school Loarcl<; have no affir-
mative dnt:· to rPalign school districts to achie...-e hetter intc-
(197) 42 U.S. C. sec. 2000 c-6. 
(199) Alexander v. Holmes County Board ol Education, 3S6 U.S. 19 (1969). 
(199) This assumes that the white and black population continue to live in 
the same neighborhood as !hey have historically done in te South. There is 
aome evidence,· however. that whites are leaving the city in the South, to avoid 
Integration among other reasons, ond this tendency may result in de facto 
liChool segregation in the South. The Courts have been attempting to lace 
the problems this presents. One type ol plan would require· students to take 
buses to schools out of their immediate neighbourhood so that an appropriate 
racial balance could be achieved. Some varieties of this plcm are being argued 
before the court as this paper is written. Charlotte Meddenburg Board v. Swann. 
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gration (200). School boards may take race into account in 
order to relieve racial imbalance (201), however, and the state 
·of Massachusetts requires school disiticts to prepare a plan to 
eliminate racial imbalance whenever the total number of 
nowhite students in a public school is in excess of fifty percent 
of the total pupils (2021. 
B.-HOUSIKG 
A state court may not enforce a restrictive eo..-enant on 
pr;opcrty which prohibits· sale to negroes (203)'. At least si.-.;:teerr 
states have :fair housing la-ws requiring nondiscrimination in 
sale or rental which apply to private housing (204). Cali-
fornia attempted to abrogate its :fair housing law by an amen-
dment .to tht:, state constitution which prohibited the state 
from limitim; the power of the individual to selLto whom he 
choses. The Court found that this amendment provided 
state authorization of discriminator~ practices. The Court 
said that the amendment encouraged housing discrimination 
and was, therefore, 1mconstitutional as state action aiding 
racial discrimination f205). 
All dq,artments a.nJ agencies of the federal government 
have been directed by executive order to take action to prevent 
diserimimition in the sale, leasing or rental of any government 
mrned, operated, or m'"isted housin~; (206). In 1968 Congress 
pas..o;;ed a statute (207) which forbids discrimination in the sale 
or rental of housing b~- an~-one except by an individual selling 
his own personal residence or an individual renting to less 
than :four families in a dw:elling which the owner himself 
occupies. In the same year the Court intNpreted a statute 
which had been enacted in the nineteenth century 208) shortly 
after the Ch-il War to forbid discrimination. in salf's hy pri-
(200) BeTJ v. School City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F. 2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963). But 
aee Bod:er v. Board of Education of Plainfield, 45 N.J. 151 (1S55). 
{201) Addabbo v. Donovan, 22 App. Div. 2d 383 (2d Dept. 1955). affd. 16 N.Y. 
2d 619 (1965). cert. den. 382 U.S. 905 (1965). 
(202) Mass G. I.. ch. 71, sec. 37D. 
{203) Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 {1948). 
(204) Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, Political end Civil Rights in the United 
States lSl8 (1957). 
{205) Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 {1967). 
(206) Executive Order No. 11063, V Fed. Reg. ll527 (1962). 
(201) 42 u.s.c. § 3601. 
(208) c All citizens of 1he United States shall have the same right, in every 
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by while citi::eru thereof to inherit, purchase, 
)ease, sen, hold and convey real and personal property." 42 u.s.c. § 1982. 
.• .' 
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vate individuals to others {209). Since then the old Civil 
'Yar statute has been ap1•licd to rights in a country club 1vhich 
was associated with a housing development (210). _AJ.thongh 
the cases interpreting the old Cidl Rights statute involved 
large developments, their reasoning indicated that even 
private individunls who would be exempted from the 1~68 
lcgisla~ion would be f>rohi11ited from discriminatin-; in the sale 
oi property by the earlier statute. The 19G8 statute provides 
more efiecth·e JWO!:edm'es and extensive remedies, so it is p1'C-
ferable to the civil injunctive proceedings under the earlier 
statute. 
C. - E~IPLO"Yt.:IENT . 
Thirty-sh states have la·ws which make racial discrimi-
nation in employment illegal (211). Discrimination in fede-
ral employment is prohibited (:212) and contracts of private 
companies 1v-ith the government include a clause aga.inst discri-
mination (213). In addition, the Xational Labor Relations 
Act makes it an uniair labor practice for a labor organization 
or its agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
diseriminate against an employee (214). A labor union which 
acts a~ the statutory representative of a craft has· "'at least 
as exacting a duty to protect C(fually the interests of the 
members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a 
legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those 
for whom it legislates (215). 
Employment in activities or il1dustries affecting commerce 
and employing more than t>\Cn:ty-five persons for at least 
twenty v/eeks each year are covered by· Title VII of the Ciril 
Rights Act of 1964 (216). 'l'hat Act makes it illegal for an 
employer or labor org-m:iization to discriminate against any 
indh..Jdual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. This includes practices such as advcltising for em-
ployment or membership which indicates preference or discri-
mination. Lower courts have interpreted the prohibition 
(209) Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1969). 
t210) Sullivan v. Little Hunting Parlc, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
t211l Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, supra note 204 at 1512-13. 
t212) Executive OrdeT No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). 
t213) Id. 
t214) 20 U.S.C. sec. 141. 
(215) Steel v. Louisville and Rashville B.R. Co., s2:J U.S. 192 0944). 
(:ll6) 42 U.S.C. sec. 2CJOOo. 
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against discrimination in Title VII not on1v to forbid discri-
mination in hiring but also to require cmplf;yers in promoting 
and filling vacancies to consider their negro employ(•i.:s on tho 
basis of seniority with the company and not to utilize past 
· discrimination against nrgTocs in certain types of jobs as a 
hindrance to thrir future promotions. In other words, n€gro 
employees who ha1l heen discriminated against in the type 
of job availal;le to them, ·arc given credit for their past service 
with the <~ompany in whatever capacity although white em-
ployees might he requi1·cd to have served in a particulal' type 
of job 'vith the company before being eligible for promo-
tion (217). 
D. - Pll3IjiC ACCO!IThiODATIO);'S 
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids discrimination in 
facilities O\v!Jcd C218) m· operated (219) h~- the state or any. 
subilivision thereof. Thirty-seven stntrs have enacted civil 
rights statutes 11ronding ('rimina1, civil and/or administrative 
remedies for persons subjected to discriminatory treatment in 
the use of public accommodations (220) (facilities open to the 
public whether owned h)-- the state or by -private individuals). 
The most thorough covf'rage of this area i<; Title II of the 
Ch-il Rights Act of 1%-± ;;hich rmvides that "All persons 
shall he entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, 
services, facilities, :privileges, advantages, accommodations, as 
defined in this section, without diserin1ination or segregation 
on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin (221)." 
This statute applies to all public accommodations affecting 
commerce with an exemption for "private clubs"'. But the 
courts have strictly construed this exception. For example, 
an effort by the proprietor to make ·an amusement area a 
••private club"' by establishing membership cards and dues to 
gain entrance to the area ;ms struck down by the Court as a 
ruse or device to avoid the statute (222). 
(217) Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Suw. 5()5 {E.D. Va. 1968). 
(218) Burton v, Wilmington Parldng Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
(219) See Evans v. Newton. 382 U.S. 296 {1966). See also no! 180. 
(220) Emerson, Haber and Dorsen, supra note 204 <It 1679-80. 
(221) 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000a. Upheld as constitutional. Heart of Atlanta 
Motel lnc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 {1964). ~zenbach v. McClung, 379 
u.s. 294 (19&1}. 
(222) Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). The senna case Ulustrates the 
scope of the limitation to c places otlecting commerce. • · The only ties which 
the recreational facility had to interstate commerce were . that it was open to 
Interstate travelers, that the Ingredients of the hot dogs, rolla and &O!t drinks 
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SU:\DL\.RY .AND CONCLlrsro~ 
In the past two decades there have been many develop-
ments strengtheilill~ human rights in the United States. The 
right to vote has been extended by the abolition of the poll 
tax awl hy law J•l'otecting the rights of the negmes. Restric-
tinns on SJWcch and movement have been sharply limited. The 
rights of the citizen have been secured mo.re firmly by the appli-
eation to the states of the constitutional guarantees against im-
proper federal goYernmental action. The most significant deve-
lopment in this area has heen the :formulation of a set of rules 
for police conduct suusequPnt to arrest. It is only within the 
past two decades that the United States has faced ·up to the 
probh,ms of r.wial discrimination and begun to do something 
to combat them. 
This vaper Jw.s discussed developments in human rights. 
It has not looked carefully at those areas of fear, prejudice, 
ana arbitrary ~H·tion where progress ha.••; not been made. :Much 
has been done. but much remains. Yet the accomp}ishments 
of the past offer hope for steady advancement in the future 
aerved at the refreshment stand came from other states; .that the juke box was 
lllade out of s:tate, ant that its paddleboats were leased irom em out-ol-st¢e 
company. Amost every place open to the public wou\d have that much of a 
relationship to interstate commerce. 
